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Abstract
Procurement auctions carry substantial risk when the value of the project is highly
uncertain and known only to insiders. This paper reports the results from a series of
experiments comparing the performance of three auction formats in such complex and
risky settings. In the experiment, every bidder knows the private value for the project
but only a single insider bidder knows the common-value part. In addition to the standard
second-price and English auctions we test the “qualifying auction,” a two-stage format
commonly used in the sale of complex and risky assets. The qualifying auction has a fully
“revealing” equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome but it also has
an uninformative “babbling” equilibrium in which bidders place arbitrarily high bids in
the first stage. In the experiments, the latter equilibrium has more drawing power, which
causes the qualifying auction to perform worse than the English auction and only slightly
better than a sealed-bid second-price auction. Compared to the two other formats, the
English auction is roughly 40% more efficient, yields 50% more revenues, avoids windfall
profits for the insider, while protecting uninformed bidders from losses.
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1. Introduction
Procurement can be a risky activity, which sometimes goes spectacularly wrong. For instance,
the supersonic passenger jet Concorde may never have generated a positive yearly profit for
either British Airways or Air France, and, clearly, the net value of the project has been negative.1
Similarly, the Channel Tunnel between England and France “took a year longer to build than
planned and cost twice the forecasted budget, so that by the time it was finished in 1994,
ten billion pound had been sunk into a magnificent hole in the ground,” Murray (2004). The
British Tourist Authority originally estimated that “In the first full year of operation, between
26 million and 29 million passengers will use the tunnel.” Ten years later, the figure has yet to
reach seven million. Richard Shirrefs, a former chief executive of Eurotunnel, acknowledged that
“without a doubt, the Channel Tunnel would not have been built if we had known about these
problems” (see The Economist, 2004). While these mishaps may have been caused by political
considerations clouding economic judgement, it seems likely that the enormous uncertainty
about the project’s value played a crucial role.
In procurement settings, potential contractors often differ in their costs of carrying out the
project but a significant part of its (unknown) value is common to all. This type of common-
value uncertainty introduces considerable strategic complexity as bidders have to worry about
the “winner’s curse,” especially when some bidders are better informed than others. For ex-
ample, when contractors bid for a house renovation, some may take careful pictures and mea-
surements of the foundation while others more or less rely on experience and intuition. For
large projects such as highway construction, some companies may be better informed if they re-
cently completed similar projects. The importance of information asymmetries in procurement
setting is further illustrated by procurement integrity restrictions that try to prevent govern-
ment employees from creating information advantages for some bidders. Punishments of up
to 5 years imprisonment illustrate both the incentive and the damage from such informational
advantages.2
Good procurement design should aim to mitigate potential winner’s curse problems, which
otherwise lead to low revenues if bidders (over)compensate for the common-value uncertainty
or result in bankruptcies if they don’t. While the latter scenario may entail high procurement
revenues in the short run it will ultimately hurt the industry and adversely affect future procure-
ment. The long-run consequences of poor auction design are illustrated by the procurement of
1See, for instance, http://www.concordesst.com/latestnews_03_2.html.
2See, for instance, http://www.cdc.gov/od/foia/policies/pir.htm.
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large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands in the eighties and nineties (such as the Schiphol
tunnel that was built to allow railway access to the national airport). The Dutch construction
sector has been plagued by a cartel pervasive enough for the Dutch Parliament to start an
inquiry. Presumably, the main reason for running a cartel is to be able to coordinate on high
prices. However, firms testified that the bidding ring was used mainly to reduce the uncertainty
associated with carrying out the project. The workings of the cartel provide some credence to
their claims. Prior to the official procurement organized by the government, firms met in the
proverbial “smoke filled room.” Each firm would write its planned bid on a piece of paper, fold
it, and put it under an ashtray. Then the project was discussed. If during these discussions a
firm realized its engineers had overlooked a construction problem, it would remove its bid from
under the ashtray.3 (One firm recalls removing its bid from under the ashtray when it realized
that the construction of a bridge required six pillars, one more than its bid accounted for.) Af-
ter the discussion phase, all remaining bids were revealed. The lowest bidder would be selected
to participate in the actual procurement auction with a marked up bid, and if this bidder won
the project the mark up would be used to compensate other ring members. We do not suggest
that information sharing (rather than price collusion) was the main motive for participating
in the cartel, but many firms complained that (without the cartel) the sealed-bid procurement
used by the Dutch government was “too competitive” and “almost surely resulted in a winner’s
curse.” In this paper, we test with an experiment whether other procurement formats better
protect bidders from the adverse effects of asymmetric common-value information.
Another situation with substantial common value risk occurs when public assets are pri-
vatized and a single “insider” bidder (e.g. a state-owned firm’s incumbent management) is
better informed about the asset’s common value. Interestingly, the World Bank’s “practition-
ers’ guide” to privatization promotes a two-stage format where in the first stage, non-binding
expressions of interest are received from potential buyers. Based on these expressions of interest
and a review of the financial capacity of potential bidders a short list of potential buyers is
selected. These bidders then move to the second stage of the process, which consists of a more
traditional auction with binding bids, see Welch and Fre´mont (1998, p. 32) for more details.
Boone and Goeree (2009) analyze the following variant: all bidders make non-binding bids in the
first stage after which all but the lowest first-stage bidder qualify for the second stage, in which
a second-price auction is used. They show this “qualifying” auction greatly alleviates winner’s
curse problems. In fact, there exists a full-revelation equilibrium of the qualifying auction that
3There is an incentive for firms to distort their information and present a more pessimistic view about the
project’s value in an attempt to scare others from taking on the project. However, the cartel met repeatedly
and cheating would certainly be punished in future encounters.
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implements the revenue-maximizing outcome. This equilibrium, however, is not unique. There
also exists an uninformative equilibrium where all bidders bid the highest possible amount in
the first stage to ensure their participation in the second stage.
Which equilibrium of the qualifying auction is more likely to be selected is an empirical
question, which we address using a controlled laboratory experiment. In addition, we compare
the performance of the qualifying auction to that of the second price and English auctions. We
find that the winner’s curse has dramatic consequences for the sealed-bid second-price format:
efficiency and revenue are low and uninformed bidders lose money on average. The English
auction is far superior: efficiency is high (close to 90%) as are revenues, leaving modest but
positive earnings for informed and uninformed bidders. The qualifying auction performs better
than the second-price auction but not nearly as well as the English auction mainly because the
uninformative equilibrium is observed more frequently in the data.
Kagel et al. (2008) report results from a related study in which they experimentally test
Ye’s (2007) model for the qualifying auction. In Ye’s approach, firm’s have to decide whether
to incur high (due diligence) costs to find out the value of a risky asset (such as an electricity
plant). If firms have only a small chance of winning the asset they would not want to invest
substantial sums of money to learn its common value. Ye (2007) therefore assumes that the
first stage of the process is used to reduce the number of participants to such an extent that it
becomes profitable for firms to invest in due diligence. His main result is that efficient entry
cannot be guaranteed by a qualifying auction while there exist other mechanisms that can.
Contrary to theoretical predictions, however, the experimental analysis in Kagel et al. (2008)
shows that the efficiency performance of the qualifying auction is actually not worse than that
of the alternative procedures. The main difference with our framework is that Ye assumes
bidders are symmetric and entry into the second stage is costly, we consider free entry but
assume that one bidder (the insider) is informed.
The experimental design and procedures are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 provides
theoretical background and predictions. Aggregate results are presented in section 4 and section
5 discusses individual bid data. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures
We ran twelve computerized experiments each consisting of 20 auction periods, see Table 1.4
The sales format was either an English auction, a qualifying auction, or a second-price auction.
In each of the three treatments, there were 40 subjects, divided into 10 groups of 4 subjects.
Subjects’ values for the (single) asset were equal to a private value plus a (common value) bonus.
The private values were iid draws from a uniform distribution on [60,100] and the bonus was
either 50 or -50, with equal probability. In each group there were two types of bidders: 1
informed bidder and 3 uninformed bidders. All bidders knew their private values but only the
informed bidder knew the group’s bonus. In each period, the informed bidder was randomly
picked, i.e. every subject had an equal chance of being informed.
In the English auction the price starts at 0 points and rises at a speed of 1 point every 0.5
seconds. Bidders’ screens display the rising price level, whether the informed bidder was active,
and how many uninformed bidders were active. At the start of the auction all bidders were
presumed to be active but as price levels rose they could push a “drop out” button to indicate
they were no longer active. After a bidder dropped out, the price clock would be paused for
10 seconds to give remaining bidders the chance to digest the information. During these 10
seconds no one could drop out. The final remaining bidder in a group received the private value
plus the bonus and had to pay the final displayed price. If all remaining bidders dropped out
at the same price level, or if the price level reached 200 points, then the winner was picked at
random from the set of active bidders.
In the second-price auction all four bidders place bids between 0 and 200 points. The highest
bidder receives the private value plus the bonus and pays the second-highest bid. In all cases,
ties are resolved at random.
Finally, the qualifying auction consists of two stages. In the first stage, all four bidders place
non-binding bids. Within each group, the lowest bidder cannot participate in the second stage,
which consists of a standard sealed-bid second-price auction. Before bidding in the second
stage, the three qualifying bidders are told the lowest first-stage bid, and whether this bid was
placed by the informed or an uninformed bidder. Bids may be any integer between 0 and 200
points in either stage. The high bidder in the second stage receives the private value plus the
bonus and pays the second-highest bid of the second stage.
The methods used to determine the values and types of the subjects, as well as the auction
rules, were explained with instructions presented before each experiment. These instructions
4The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Treatment Group Size # of Groups Private Values Common Values
English 4 10 U[60,100] {-50,50}
Second-Price 4 10 U[60,100] {-50,50}
Qualifying 4 10 U[60,100] {-50,50}
Table 1. Experimental design.
were projected on a screen and read aloud so that they would be common knowledge. At the
beginning of the experiments, each subject received 50 points to which their earnings in each
of the 20 auctions were added. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid $1 for every 5
points (plus a show-up fee of $5). Bidders whose cumulative profits were negative at the end of
the experiment received only the show-up fee. Data from groups in which one or more bidders
went bankrupt are not used in the analysis reported below. For statistical purposes, the private
values, common values, groups and types for each bidder in each period were randomly drawn
before the experiments, and reused for each of the three treatments. Also, the composition of
the groups stayed the same during the experiments.
Before the experiment started, subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire to make sure
they understood how their profits were determined. In this questionnaire, the subjects were
given a set of random bids and a private value (determined by the roll of two dice), and then
given the outcome of the auction (you won/you lost) and the common value for their group.
They were then asked to calculate their own profits with these values. The numbers used
for the questionnaire were chosen so they would not be in the range of numbers the subjects
would see in the experiment, to emphasize that this was just to practice payoff calculations. All
experiments were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at Caltech.
3. Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium strategies for the informed and uninformed bidders
for the three auction formats used in the experiment. Proofs of the lemmas below can be found
in Boone and Goeree (2009) and the Appendix.
3.1. English Auction
The following lemma characterizes equilibrium outcomes of the English auction.5 Here bI(sI |ϑ)
denotes the insider’s bidding function, which depends only on the insider’s information. An
5Hernando-Veciana (2004) and Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2004) cover the simpler case of two bidders.
6
uninformed bidder’s bidding function, bSU(vU |~p ), depends on the set of other bidders that are
still active (S) and on the prices (~p ) at which non-active bidders have dropped out.
Lemma 1 The informed bidder drops out at bI(vI |ϑ) = vI + ϑ where ϑ = ±50.
(i) When all bidders are active, uninformed bidders drop out at b
{I,U,U}
U (vU) = vU − 50.
(ii) When another uninformed bidder has dropped out at price p1U , the remaining uninformed
bidders drop out at
b
{I,U}
U (vU |p1U) =

vU − 50 if 60 ≤ vU < v1U
vU − 50 + 3
√
120((vU − 80)2 − (v1U − 80)2) if v1U ≤ vU < v2U
vU + 50 if v
2
U ≤ vU ≤ 100
where v1U = max(80, p
1
U + 50) and v
2
U = 60 +
3
√
120(v1U − 80)2 + 16000.
(iii) When two other uninformed bidders have dropped out at prices p1U ≤ p2U , the remaining
uninformed bidder drops out at
b
{I}
U (vU |p1U , p2U) =
{
vU − 50 if vU < v3U
vU + 50 if vU ≥ v3U
where
v3U =

80 if p2U < 30
p2U + 10 +
√
80(50− p2U) if 30 ≤ p2U < 50
60 if p2U ≥ 50
(iv) When the insider drops out at price pI , uninformed bidders drop out at b
S
U(vU |pI) =
pI + max(0, vU − vI) for S = {U}, {U,U}, and {U,U, U}, where vI solves pI = bI(vI |ϑ)
for ϑ = ±50.
To summarize: (i) when all bidders are active, uninformed bidders bid cautiously (as if they
know the common value is −50) to avoid a winner’s curse. After one of the uninformed bidders
has dropped out, (ii) remaining uninformed bidders with high valuations are willing to bid more
in an attempt to end up in the final sub-game against the insider. In this sub-game, (iii) an
uninformed bidder with a high valuation bids aggressively (as if she knows the common value
is +50) and expects positive profits from doing so. Finally, (iv) multiple uninformed bidders
may want to get out “in a rush” if the insider drops out early in the auction.
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The English auction is not necessarily efficient. Suppose, for example, that the insider’s
value, vI , is less than the highest of the uninformed bidders’ valuations, vU , which in turn is
less than the average value, i.e. vI < vU < 80. Then the insider wins when the common value
is +50, which is inefficient. Likewise, when 80 < vU < vI and the common value is −50, the
efficient allocation is to assign the asset to the insider but one of the uninformed bidders will
win the auction.
3.2. Second-Price Auction
In the English auction, uninformed bidders can drop out immediately after the informed bidder
drops out at a low price. In contrast, in a sealed-bid framework there is no opportunity for the
uninformed bidders to learn about the asset’s common value. As a result, a winning uninformed
bidder may have to pay another uninformed bidder’s high bid when the bonus is −50. To avoid
such a loss (of approximately 100) uninformed bidders will bid have to bid cautiously, especially
as the number of other uninformed bidders increases.
Lemma 2 The informed bidder bids bI(vI) = vI ± 50. An uninformed bidder bids
bU(vU) =
{
vU − 50 if vU < v1U
B(vU) if vU ≥ v1U
where B(vU) is shown by the solid line in Figure 1 when there are three uninformed bidders and
v1U = 95, by the long-dashed line when there are two uninformed bidders and v
1
U = 91, and by
the short-dashed line when there is one uninformed bidder and v1U = 80.
Note that bids decline as more uninformed bidders enter the auction because of the aggravated
winner’s curse problem. For the case of three uninformed bidders, the optimal bids in the
second-price auction can be much less aggressive than in the English auction, which hurts
expected revenues. There are two scenarios in which efficiency of the second price auction is
adversely affected. When the bonus is high, there is a wide range of values for vU such that
uninformed bidders bid low and the informed bidder wins even though vI < vU . Furthermore,
even if uninformed bidders bid high, there is a probability that vI +50 > B(vU) while vU > vI .
3.3. Qualifying Auction
As described in section 2, the qualifying auction consists of two stages, with non-binding first-
stage bids and binding second-stage bids. Like the English auction, the first stage allows
uninformed bidders to receive information about the asset’s common value. The following
lemma describes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome for the qualifying auction.
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Figure 1. The horizontal axis corresponds to an uninformed bidder’s private
value and the vertical axis corresponds to the bidder’s optimal bid. The lines
show the optimal bidding functions for the second price auction with one in-
sider and three uninformed bidders (solid line), two uninformed bidders (long
dashes), and one uninformed bidder (short dashes).
Lemma 3 The first stage bids are equal to the bidder’s (unconditional) expected valuations of
the asset:
bI(vI) = vI ± 50
bU(vU) = vU
After being told the losing bid and the losing bidder’s identity, the remaining uninformed bidders
are able to infer the bonus (−50 if the losing bidder is informed, +50 otherwise). In the second
stage the optimal bid for all remaining bidders is
b(v) = v ± 50.
To see that there is no incentive for the informed bidder to deviate, suppose the informed
bidder wants to convey bad news about the common value when the bonus equals +50. She
can only do so by bidding low, but then she will not be able to participate in the second stage.
Likewise, if the bonus is −50 points and the informed bidder bids as if it were +50 points, the
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uninformed bidders expect the common value to be +50 and outbid the informed bidder in the
second stage.
Boone and Goeree (2009) show that this “revealing” equilibrium implements the revenue-
maximizing outcome. It is not fully efficient: when the bonus is low and the informed bidder has
the highest private value, the object will be assigned to an uninformed bidder (since the informed
bidder will not make it to the second stage). In all other cases, the object is allocated efficiently.
The revealing equilibrium is also not unique; the next Lemma describes an uninformative
equilibrium.6
Lemma 4 With the bids constrained to b ≤ 200, bids in the first stage are
bI(vI) = 200,
bU(vU) = 200.
With no extra information obtained from the first stage, the three remaining bidders in the
second stage participate in a sealed-bid second-price auction (one bidder is randomly chosen
not to participate in the second stage). If the informed bidder enters the second stage, she bids
bI(vI) = vI ± 50 while the uninformed bidders bid
bU(vU) =
{
vU − 50 if vU < 91
B˜(vU) if vU ≥ 91
where B˜(v) is shown in Figure 1 (long dashes). If the informed bidder does not enter the second
stage, uninformed bidders bid their private values bU(v) = vU .
This “babbling” equilibrium arises when bidders do not wish to reveal their valuations to other
bidders. For the informed bidder this creates an opportunity to take advantage of the unin-
formed bidders’ lack of information in the second stage. In this sense, the babbling equilibrium
may appear the payoff-dominant choice for the informed bidder. However, if only the insider
deviates from the revealing equilibrium by bidding the maximum of 200 then this deviation is
(of course) not profitable. And the uninformed bidders are not necessarily better off under the
babbling equilibrium (even though their chance of entering the second stage may be higher)
because of the winner’s curse they face in the resulting second-price auction. Put differently,
the babbling equilibrium is not payoff dominant for all players and, hence, is not necessarily
the “focal” equilibrium.7
6Other equilibria may exist. We focus on the revealing equilibrium and babbling equilibrium as they seem
to describe the data well.
7In addition, payoff dominance is not a robust equilibrium selection criteria, at least for many coordination
games studied in the experimental literature.
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English Second-Price
Qualifying
Revealing
Qualifying
Babbling
English Second-Price Qualifying
Revenue 75.37(12.34) 49.51(8.04) 84.29(7.10) 59.19(6.55) 79.41(8.77) 53.79(10.76) 58.81(8.82)
Efficiency (%) 98.04(1.70) 76.97(5.45) 92.96(3.71) 80.32(4.08) 87.07(4.83) 63.45(10.84) 68.94(11.50)
Earnings ($) 14.83(5.92) 34.76(8.44) 9.36(1.40) 31.29(7.33) 8.56(8.83) 27.18(7.98) 28.76(6.44)
  - Uninformed ($) 8.03(1.57) 2.43(3.15) 8.79(1.59) 12.06(3.53) 4.38(7.67) -1.23(2.67) 8.74(8.94)
  - Informed ($) 6.80(6.24) 32.33(9.80) 0.56(0.68) 19.23(7.09) 4.19(4.33) 28.41(6.90) 20.01(11.31)
Bankruptcies (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Experimental Results
Theory Observed
Table 2. Aggregate statistics.
4. Results: Aggregate Data
In this section we report aggregate results such as efficiency (E), revenue (R), and bidders’
earnings (pi). We define the auction’s efficiency as:
E =
vwinner − vlow
vhigh − vlow × 100%
where vwinner is the private value of the auction’s winner, vlow is the lowest private value within
the group, and vhigh is the highest private value within the group.
8 Revenue is equal to the
winner’s payment and the winner’s earnings equal her total value minus her payment (losing
bidders earn nothing). The theoretical predictions reported below are based on the private
values and bonuses that were used in the experiments.
Revenue: The top row in Table 2 shows predicted (left panel) and observed (right panel)
revenues for the three auction formats.9 In theory, the revealing equilibrium of the qualifying
auction results in the highest revenue, followed by the English auction, the babbling equilibrium
of the qualifying auction, and, finally, the second price auction. This ranking is also reflected
by the cumulative distributions of revenues shown in the top panel of Figure 2.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the observed distributions of revenues in the three
formats. The distribution of revenues in the English auction is shifted to the right and domi-
nates the revenue distributions of the other two formats (in the sense of first-degree stochastic
dominance). The distribution of revenues in the qualifying auction seemingly dominates that
of the second price auction but the differences are not significant. The middle panel of Table 3
8This measure is invariant under translations or rescalings of the values. Note that if the bidder with the
lowest private value is the winner of the auction, efficiency is 0%, and if the bidder with the highest private
value is the winner, efficiency is 100%.
9The numbers reported in the observed columns are based on all 20 periods. We also computed these
statistics for the last 10 periods only and found no significant differences.
11
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
English Second-Price Qualifying Revealing Qualifying Babbling
Figure 2.Cumulative distributions of revenues for the different auction for-
mats. The top panel shows theoretical predicted revenue distributions and the
bottom panel shows observed revenue distributions.
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shows revenue differences across formats; the results reinforce the conclusion that the English
auction revenue dominates the other formats while the second price and qualifying auctions
yield similar revenues:
REnglish Â∗∗ R2nd price ∼ RQualifying,
where Â∗∗ indicates significantly higher at the 1% level.10
Efficiency: In theory, efficiency should be highest in the English auction, followed by the
qualifying auction, and then the second price auction. This ranking is also observed in the
data, see the middle panel of Table 3. Again the differences between the English auction and
the other two formats are highly significant, while the second price and qualifying auctions lead
to similar efficiency levels:
EEnglish Â∗∗ E2nd price ∼ EQualifying.
The magnitude of the inefficiencies that occur in the second price auction can be inferred from
the second row of Table 2. Efficiency in the second price auction is only 63% compared to
87% in the English auction. This suggests one reason why revenue is lower in the second
price auction; the pie to be divided between bidders and the seller is smaller. Another reason,
however, is that informed bidders often gain windfall profits in the second price auction.
Bidders’ Profits: The third row in Table 2 shows bidders’ earnings; rows 4 and 5 show how these
earnings are split between the informed and uninformed bidders. In the English auction, the
informed and uninformed bidders make similar profits that are modest in size. In contrast, in
the second price auction, uninformed bidders lose money on average while the informed bidder
makes a large profit. In the qualifying auction, the informed bidder also makes a substantial
profit but now the uninformed bidders’ earnings are positive. Aggregating the profits for the
informed and uninformed bidders shows:
piEnglish ≺∗∗ pi2nd price ∼ piQualifying,
see the earnings column in the middle panel of Table 3. The final two columns in that panel
demonstrate that the uninformed bidders are significantly better off in the English or qualifying
auction compared to the second price auction. In contrast, the informed bidder is significantly
worse off in the English auction.
10The numbers reported are based on all 20 periods, but all of our conclusions remain the same when we
consider only data from the final ten periods.
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Revenue Efficiency (%) Earnings ($) Uninformed ($) Informed ($)
English - Second-Price 25.86** 21.07** -19.93** 5.60** -25.53**
English - Qualifying (R / B) -8.93 / 16.18** 5.07* / 17.71** 5.47* / -16.46** -0.77 / -4.03* 6.24* / -12.43**
Qualifying (R / B) - Second-Price 34.78** / 9.68* 16.00** / 3.36 -25.40** / -3.47 6.37** / 9.63** -31.77** / -13.10*
Revenue Efficiency (%) Earnings ($) Uninformed ($) Informed ($)
English - Second-Price 25.62** 23.63** -18.61** 5.61 -24.22**
English - Qualifying 20.60** 18.13** -20.19** -4.37 -15.83**
Qualifying - Second-Price 5.02 5.49 1.58 9.98* -8.39
Revenue Efficiency (%) Earnings ($) Uninformed ($) Informed ($)
English 4.04 -10.96** -6.26 -3.65 -2.61
Second-Price 4.28 -13.52* -7.58 -3.66 -3.93
Qualifying Revealing -25.48** -24.02** 19.40** -0.05 19.45**
Qualifying Babbling -0.37 -11.38* -2.53 -3.31 0.78
* (**) indicates p-value of less than 5% (1%)
Differences across Formats: Theory
Differences across Formats: Observed
Differences between Observed and Theory
Table 3. Comparing the different formats: theory (top panel),
observed (middle panel), and theory vs. observed (bottom panel).
Summary: Applying standard criteria to evaluate alternative auction formats, i.e. efficiency,
revenue, and non-negative bidder profits, results in a clear winner. The English auction is
highly efficient, produces the most revenue, and provides modest profits for the informed and
uninformed bidders. In contrast, the second price auction results in low efficiencies and revenues
and uninformed bidders lose money on average. Finally, the qualifying auction performs slightly
better than the second price auction but not nearly as well as the English auction.
The bottom panel of Table 3 compares observed behavior with theoretical predictions. Note
that actual efficiency levels are significantly lower than predicted in all three formats. The other
measures, however, nicely conform to theoretical predictions, where for the qualifying auction
it is the babbling equilibrium that has the most drawing power.
5. Results: Individual Data
We study individual bidding behavior by computing empirical bidding functions that result from
taking moving averages of observed bids for each value category. In particular, for uninformed
bidders we take the average bid for each private value category and for the informed bidders we
take the average bid for each total value category (private value plus bonus). Then we average
5 categories to form moving averages. The results are displayed in Figure 3.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the empirical bidding functions for the English auction.
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Figure 3. Moving averages of observed bids as a function of private values (60-100) for unin-
formed bidders and of total values (10-50 or 110-150) for the informed bidder. The top, middle,
and bottom panels pertain to the English, second price, and qualifying auctions respectively.
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For the informed bidders (with total values in the ranges 10-50 and 110-150) we separated out
the 8 bids on the left where they “trick” the uninformed bidders into believing the bonus is
high and the 11 bids on the right where they drop out early leaving windfall profits for the
uninformed bidders. Bids for the remaining 141 auctions are all very close to (total) value:
the empirical bidding functions more or less coincide with the relevant 45-degree lines. For the
uninformed bidders (range 60-100) we split the observed bids in low bids (< 80) and high bids
(> 80). The resulting moving average lines coincide with bidding your value plus or minus 50,
see the middle part of the top panel. In other words, uninformed bidders in the experiment bid
their private values plus or minus 50 and do so independent of their private values (unlike the
predictions of Lemma 1).11
The middle panel of Figure 3 shows empirical bidding functions in the second price auction.
Behavior of the informed bidders again nicely conforms with bidding ones total value.12 For
the uninformed bidders we did not split the bids into low and high bids, because this resulted
in no discernable pattern (unlike in the English auction). The empirical bidding function for
the uninformed bidders is parallel to bidding ones value minus 50, but exceeds this line by
10 or so points. This is the reason that uninformed bidders’ profits are negative: the inflated
bids reduce the informed bidder’s profit when the informed bidder wins (which typically occurs
when the bonus is high, i.e. with probability 0.5) and lowers the uninformed bidders’ profits
otherwise (Table 2).
Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the empirical bids for the two stages of the
qualifying auction. The three top lines depict the moving averages of the first-stage bids.
Obviously, uninformed bidders and informed bidders who received good news are selecting
the babbling equilibrium by putting in first-stage bids that exceed the highest possible total
value. The first-stage informed bids are somewhat lower when the bonus is low, which helps
uninformed bidders avoid the winner’s curse to some degree. Second stage informed bids again
nicely conform to bidding ones total value and second stage uninformed bids parallel but exceed
bidding ones value minus 50. Indeed, the second stage bids of the bottom panel are very similar
to the bids in the middle panel. Hence, the improved performance of the qualifying auction
vis-a`-vis the second price auction is not due to different bidding behavior (as predicted by the
11Although the fraction of low (high) bids is higher when the private value is less (more) than average.
12This is a remarkable feature of our data. There have been numerous private-value second price auction
experiments showing substantial overbidding relative to bidders’ values, e.g. Kagel (1995). Likewise, there have
been numerous experiments demonstrating the robustness of the winner’s curse in common value auctions, e.g.
Kagel and Levin (2002). Even though our setup with private and common values is more complicated than
that of previous studies, observed bids are organized around the relevant 45-degree lines in all three panels of
Figure 3.
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revealing equilibrium of Lemma 3) but rather to the (almost) random exclusion of one of the
bidders (as predicted by the babbling equilibrium of Lemma 4).13
In other words, subjects seem to bid according to the babbling equilibrium of Lemma 4.
This conclusion is corroborated when considering the probabilities with which the informed
bidder enters the second stage. Recall from Lemma 4 that in the babbling equilibrium, all
bidders put in the maximum first-stage bid (of 200) and the insider bidder’s chance of entering
the second stage is only 75%. In the experiment, the observed frequency with which the insider
enters the second stage is 77% when the bonus is high and 50% when it is low.
6. Conclusion
Procurement and privatization auctions can be complex and risky. Consider, for instance, the
case where a state-owned firm is put up for bid. Interested parties may differ in terms of
their abilities to exploit the firm’s resources, which translates into different private values. In
addition, the firm’s profitability may depend on the industry’s general outlook, which applies
to all bidders. Hence, bidders’ values contain both private and common value elements. To
complicate matters, bidders often differ in terms of the quality of the information they possess,
which aggravates adverse selection effects inherent to auctions where common values play a
role.
In this paper, we experimentally study bidding behavior in such complex and risky settings.
In the experiment, bidders’ values for the object for sale consist of both a private value part
plus a common value bonus. The bonus is relatively large compared to private value differences
to stress the common value risk. Furthermore, a single insider bidder is told the common value
bonus to stress informational asymmetries. Laboratory experiments provide an ideal tool to
measure the efficacy of alternative auction formats in this environment.
We compare three formats: the ascending English auction, the sealed-bid second-price auc-
tion, and the qualifying auction, a two-stage format advocated by the World Bank to privatize
firms (see Welch and Fre´mont, 1998). In the first stage of the qualifying auction, bidders place
non-binding bids to determine who qualifies for the second stage, which consists of a standard
second-price auction. Boone and Goeree (2009) show theoretically that the qualifying auction
has a fully “revealing” equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome. In ad-
dition, it has an uninformative or “babbling” equilibrium where bidders place arbitrarily high
13This is akin to Bulow and Klemperer’s (2002) finding that in a pure common-value auction, reducing the
number of bidders may increase revenue because it alleviates the winner’s curse problem.
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bids in the first stage. Laboratory experiments allow for a careful evaluation of the resulting
equilibrium selection problem.
Comparing the English auction with a sealed bid second price auction shows a dramatic
difference in performance: the English auction is roughly 40% more efficient, generates almost
50% more revenue, reduces the informed bidder’s windfall profits by a factor of seven, and
protects uninformed bidders from making losses. Furthermore, our experimental results indicate
that the babbling equilibrium has more drawing power in the qualifying auction. As a result,
this format performs only slightly better than the second-price auction and much worse than
the English auction.
Our results are important for improved auction design when valuations are complex and
information asymmetries exist. The negative effects of using a sealed bid format are illus-
trated by the procurement of large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands in the eighties
and nineties. Uninformed bidders complained they would almost surely fall prey to a winner’s
curse had they not pooled their information before the auction. Of course, the resulting Dutch
construction cartel that organized this type of information sharing also facilitated price collu-
sion, which ultimately led to a parliamentary inquiry. Our results suggest that an ascending
format, where information is revealed during the bidding process, might have led to a more
healthy construction industry.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
The insider bids up to her known value in the English auction. Once the insider drops
out, all active uninformed bidders can perfectly infer the common value and, hence, their total
values. If the price at which the insider dropped out exceeds the total value of an uninformed
bidder then this bidder will drop out immediately, otherwise she will bid up to her total value.
This establishes (iv). To prove (iii), suppose two uninformed bidders have dropped out: the
first drop-out level is denoted p1U and the second drop-out level is p
2
U ≥ p1U .14 The remaining
uninformed bidder’s expected payoffs depend on p2U . If p
2
U < vU − 50 then
pi(vU |p2U) =
1
40
max
{
1
2
∫ vU
p2U+50
(vU − y)dy, 12
∫ 100
p2U+50
(vU − y)dy + 12
∫ vU
60
(vU − y)dy
}
The first term of the max function corresponds to the case where the remaining uninformed
bidder bids low, i.e. up to her value minus 50 (in which case she wins only if the insider has bad
news), and the second term corresponds to the case where the uninformed bidder bids high,
i.e. up to her value plus 50. The multiplying factor 1/40 results from the fact that values are
uniform on [60, 100]. Likewise, if p2U > vU − 50 then
pi(vU |p2U) =
1
40
max
{
0, 1
2
∫ 100
pU+50
(vU − y)dy + 12
∫ vU
60
(vU − y)dy
}
where the first term of the max function occurs when the uninformed bidder drops out right
away and the second term occurs when she bids high. Summarizing:
pi(vU |p2U) =
{
max{0, 1
160
(vU − p2U − 50)2 + 12(vU − 80)} if vU ≤ p2U + 50
1
160
(vU − p2U − 50)2 + 12 max{0, vU − 80} if vU > p2U + 50
(A.1)
Note that the second argument of the max function in the top line of (A.1) is increasing in vU
and maximized at vU = p
2
U+50 with resulting value p
2
U−30. Hence, when p2U ≤ 30, uninformed
bidders with values vU ≤ p2U + 50 drop out right away, those with values p2U + 50 < vU < 80
bid up to vU − 50, and those with values vU ≥ 80 bid up to vU + 50. Hence, v3U = 80 when
p2U ≤ 30. When 30 ≤ p2U ≤ 50, the second argument of the max function in the top line of
(A.1) is positive iff the uninformed bidder’s value exceeds
p2U + 10 +
√
80(50− p2U). (A.2)
14Note that, in equilibrium, no bidder drops out below a price of 10 since bidders’ total values are at least 10.
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Uninformed bidders with values less than (A.2) drop out right away (note that (A.2) is less
than p2U +50 when p
2
U ≥ 30) and those with values greater than (A.2) bid up to vU +50. Hence,
v3U is given by (A.2) when 30 ≤ p2U ≤ 50. Finally, p2U ≥ 50 implies that two uninformed bidders
and the insider are still active, so, in equilibrium, the insider must have received good news.
Now v3U = 60. This establishes (iii).
To prove (ii), suppose the equilibrium drop-out level for an uninformed bidder with value
vU is bU(vU), which (obviously) is no less than vU − 50. To derive bU(vU) consider the costs
and benefits that arise when the bidder deviates by staying in a little longer (i.e. as if her
type is vU + ²), which have to cancel in equilibrium. The benefit of this deviation is that the
other uninformed bidder may drop out in between, in which case the uninformed bidder faces
only the insider and she receives payoffs pi(vU |bU(vU)). The downside is that the insider may
drop out in between, after which the uninformed bidder wants to drop out but, with chance
(bU(vU)− vU + 50)/40, so does the other uninformed bidder.
For uninformed bidders with values vU ≤ 80 the continuation profits are 0 beyond a price
level of vU−50, since they drop out immediately at that level even if the other uninformed drops
out and they only compete against the insider. So uninformed bidders with values vU ≤ 80
bid low: bU(vU) = vU − 50. Furthermore, if p1U > 30 then we have the boundary condition
bU(p
1
U +50) = p
1
U , i.e. an uninformed bidder with the same value as the first uninformed bidder
to drop out, wants to drop out immediately after.15 So when p1U > 30, uninformed bidders
with values 80 ≤ vU ≤ p1U + 50 also bid low. The two cases can be combined by defining
v1U = max(80, p
1
U +50) so that bU(vU) = vU −50 for vU ≤ v1U . For vU > v1U the bidding function
bU(vU) satisfies the first-order condition is:
− 1
2
· 1
2
· 1
40
b′U(vU)(bU(vU)− vU + 50)2 + 1160(vU − bU(vU)− 50)2 + 12(vU − 80) = 0. (A.3)
The first term of (A.3) corresponds to the case where the insider dropped out (in which case the
insider must have had bad news, which occurs with probability 1
2
) and the other bidder wants to
drop out as well (with probability (bU(vU)−vU+50)/40) and with probability 12 the uninformed
bidder is selected to win the auction (at a loss vU − 50− bU(vU)). The second and third term
correspond to the continuation payoff pi(vU |bU(vU)) in (A.1) for the case bU(vU) ≥ vU − 50.
15Suppose not, and this bidder would stay in at least ∆ longer, then so would uninformed bidders with higher
types. Hence, as the price rises from p1U to p
1
U +∆, no uninformed bidder would drop out but the insider might,
which would result in an expected loss.
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The solution to (A.3) is given by
bU(vU) = vU − 50 + 3
√
120((vU − 80)2 − (v1U − 80)2)
for v1U ≤ vU ≤ v2U = 60+ 3
√
120(v1U − 80)2 + 16000. At v2U the optimal bid bU(v2U) = 50 and the
uninformed bidders know for sure they are no longer competing against an insider with bad
news. Hence, for vU > v
2
U they will bid high, i.e. bU(v
2
U) = vU + 50. This establishes (ii).
Finally, to prove (i), consider the analogue of the first-order condition in (A.3) for the case
of 3 uninformed bidders. When deviating by bidding as if one’s value is vU + ² the possibility
of a loss (when the insider drops out) is proportional to ², while now the possibility of a gain
is of order ²2 since both other uninformed bidders would have to drop out (if only one of them
drops out then another uninformed bidder must have a higher private value and the deviation
will not result in a gain). Hence bU(vU) = vU − 50, which establishes (i). Q.E.D.
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